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What Makes Firm-based Vocational Training Schemes 
Successful? The Role of Commitment†
By Christian Dustmann and Uta Schönberg*
This paper studies a possible market failure in the firm-based voca-
tional training market: training may be too complex to be specified 
in a contract so that it is legally enforceable, resulting in the inability 
of firms to commit to training provision. We present a model of firm 
provided training and show that training is substantially lower in the 
no commitment than in the commitment case. Thus, firm-based voca-
tional training schemes are more successful in countries where com-
mitment to training provision is more widespread. (JEL J24, L25, 
M12, M53)
Among industrialized countries, workplace related and vocational skill devel-opment is (once again) recognized as a key factor in strengthening competi-
tiveness and growth, as reflected in, e.g., President Obama’s “manufacturing skill 
speech,” or the renewed emphasis on firm-based apprenticeship programs of the 
British Government.1 The key question is how to best develop these skills. Some 
countries, like the United States, Sweden, France, and Italy, provide vocational 
training in the form of community colleges or full-time, school-based vocational 
education. Other countries like Germany, Austria, and Switzerland run large-scale 
firm-based apprenticeship schemes that combine firm-provided, on-the-job training 
with state-provided, school-based education, lasting between two and three years, 
and with two in three individuals of each cohort receiving post-secondary education 
within these schemes.2 Firm-based apprenticeship training schemes have a number 
of advantages over vocational schools: craft techniques and customer interaction 
may be taught more effectively in a work environment than in the classroom, and 
firms may know better than schools which skills are needed at the workplace. Firm-
based training may also allow for smoother transitions of firm-trained apprentices 
into employment (see Ryan 2001a, and Parey 2009 for evidence). Several coun-
tries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia have 
1 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/08/president-obama-and-skills-americas-future-part-
ners-announce-initiatives and the latest UK 2011 budget (http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf) 
in which the government announces an additional £180 million for up to 50, 000 additional apprenticeship places.
2 See e.g., Winkelmann (1997) and Harhoff and Kane (1997) for comparisons in post-school training between 
Germany and the United States.
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attempted in the recent past to implement new, or to expand existing, firm-based 
apprenticeship schemes (see, e.g., Bowers, Sonnet, and Bardone 1999, for an over-
view), often with little success, as evidenced by low enrollment rates and widespread 
concerns about the quality of training (see, e.g., Wolf 2011 and Adult Learning 
Inspectorate 2006 for the United Kingdom, and Schofield 2000 for Australia).3
In this paper, we address the question of why firm-based vocational training 
schemes work in some countries but not in others. We focus on a possible market 
failure in the training market that has been discussed in the case of specific training 
by, for instance, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Prendergast (1993).4 Since 
training takes place inside firms, it is not easily verifiable by a third party and may 
simply be too complex to be specified in a contract in a way that is legally enforce-
able. Suppose that firms promise workers a certain level of training in exchange for 
an apprenticeship wage that is well below the wage offered to unskilled workers. 
Clearly, firms have a strong incentive to renege on this promise, as they can increase 
profits by employing the trainee on tasks typically performed by unskilled workers 
(such as preparing coffee and cleaning machines) rather than teaching him new 
skills. If training contracts are not enforceable, such a breach of contract will go 
unpunished. In equilibrium, workers anticipate this and are therefore only willing 
to accept training contracts they consider as credible. We refer to the ability of the 
firm to credibly assure workers that they will not renege on their training promises 
and deliver the promised training intensity as commitment to training provision. 
Our hypothesis is that apprenticeship training schemes are more successful—as 
evidenced by higher enrollment rates and lower dropout rates—in countries like 
Germany than they are in Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom because 
commitment to training provision is more widespread. We further hypothesize that 
this may be due to a well-structured regulatory framework and monitoring institu-
tions that exist in Germany but are absent in Anglo-Saxon countries.
To provide support for our hypothesis, we first present a model of firm-provided 
training. Becker (1962) shows that if training is fully general and labor markets are 
perfectly competitive, firms are not able to recoup the return of that investment, 
and are therefore not willing to finance general training. Consequently, the training 
market will break down completely, and there will be no training in equilibrium if 
firms are unable to commit to training provision. Any other training level will not be 
seen as credible by workers. In contrast, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, and 
1999b) point out that firms will provide general training even if they cannot commit 
to training provision if wages are compressed. With wage compression, the profit of 
firms increases with training, and firms therefore capture some of the return to gen-
eral training (see also Stevens 1994a). Based on the work by Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1998, 1999a, 1999b), a common explanation for why firm-based training schemes 
3 See, e.g., Münch (1992), Soskice (1994), and Franz and Soskice (1995) for more details on the German 
apprenticeship system; Tritscher-Archan (2009) on the Austrian apprenticeship system; Hoeckel, Field, and Grubb 
(2009), and Hanhart and Bossio (1998) for the Swiss apprenticeship system; Ryan (2000, 2001b), Ryan and Unwin 
(2001), Gospel (1998), and Steedman, Gospel, and Ryan (1998) on the UK apprenticeship system; and Sharpe and 
Gibson (2005) and Knight and Mlotkowski (2009) on the Canadian and Australian apprenticeship system.
4 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999) discuss this problem for the case of general training, but do not develop 
its implications for training policies.
38 AmEricAN EcoNomic JourNAL: AppLiEd EcoNomics ApriL 2012
work better in some countries than in others is that countries with successful train-
ing schemes exhibit a larger degree of wage compression than countries with less 
successful training schemes. Our model does not exclude this as an explanation why 
training intensities differ across countries. However, our key point is that two coun-
tries with the same degree of wage compression may differ greatly in their training 
intensities because of differences in firms’ ability to commit to training provision.
To demonstrate this, we present a model where wages are compressed due to 
firm-specific training and asymmetric information between training and outside 
firms, although the key conclusions from our model do not depend on the exact 
sources of wage compression.5 We show that if firms are able to commit to training 
provision, they provide a training intensity that is socially optimal and that equates 
the marginal cost of training with the worker’s and firm’s joint return to training. If, 
in contrast, firms are not able to commit to training provision, they provide a training 
intensity that is below the socially optimal level and that equates the marginal cost of 
training with the firm’s private return to training. Thus, the training intensity under 
no commitment is closer to the socially optimal training intensity as provided under 
commitment, the higher the level of wage compression in the economy.
Figure 1 illustrates this.6 In panel A, we compare the training intensities under 
commitment and no commitment predicted by our model for increasing levels of 
wage compression due to firm-specific human capital accumulation, assuming 
that there are no informational asymmetries between training and outside firms. In 
panel B, we compare the training intensities under the two scenarios for increas-
ing levels of wage compression due to asymmetric information, now assuming that 
training is completely general. If training is completely general, and if there are 
no informational asymmetries between training and outside firms, then the training 
intensity under no commitment is zero, whereas under commitment, it is equal to 
the socially optimal level. If, in contrast, training is completely firm-specific, or if 
the informational advantage of training firms is substantial, the training intensity 
under no commitment approaches, for the chosen parameter values, 85 percent and 
65 percent of that under commitment.
For the case of the German apprenticeship system, we then quantify how much 
lower the training intensities are in the no commitment case than in the commitment 
case, by calibrating our model to match levels of wage compression due to firm-
specificity and asymmetric information that are consistent with those observed in 
the data. We find that according to our baseline estimate, training under no commit-
ment is only 28 percent of that under commitment to training provision. This will 
result in lower enrollment rates into training if there are fixed costs of training and 
workers are ex ante heterogenous. We finally provide several pieces of evidence that 
commitment to training provision is more problematic in Anglo-Saxon countries 
than in Germany, and argue that this may be linked to stricter apprenticeship regula-
tion in Germany.
5 Other reasons for wage compression include asymmetric information between potential trainees and training 
firms (Autor 2001), as well as minimum wages and union agreements (e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b, 2003; 
Dustmann and Schönberg 2009).
6 See Section IIA and footnote 11 for details on the figure.
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Our findings suggest that attempts to revitalize apprenticeship training in Anglo-
Saxon countries have been less successful than expected, as these countries may 
not have paid enough attention to the enforceability of apprenticeship contracts and 
to ensure that firms are able to commit to training provision. Instead, policymak-
ers often provide incentives for workers or firms to participate in apprenticeship 
programs through subsidies. However, subsidy policies do not change the firm’s 
optimization problem, and hence do not help to implement the optimal training 
intensity under commitment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops a model of 
firm-provided training, analyzes it under both commitment and no commitment to 
training provision, and discusses the firm’s incentives to commit to training provi-
sion. In Section II, we describe how we calibrate the model in order to quantify how 
much lower the training intensity is under no commitment than under commitment. 
We report results in Section IIB. In Section III, we provide some tentative support 
for the hypothesis that commitment to training provision is more problematic in 
Anglo-Saxon countries than in Germany, and that this might be due to the stricter 
apprenticeship regulation in Germany. We conclude in Section IV.
I. A Model of Firm-Provided Training
In this section, we present a model of firm-provided training, where firms may 
finance training because of wage compression due to firm-specific training and 
asymmetric information between training and outside firms.
Figure 1. Wage Compression and Training Intensities under Commitment and  
No Commitment to Training Provision
Notes: In panel A, we compare the training intensities under commitment and no commitment to training provi-
sion predicted by our model for increasing levels of wage compression due to firm-specific training, and assume 
that there is no informational asymmetry between training and outside firms. In panel B, we compare the training 
intensities under commitment and no commitment to training provision for increasing levels of wage compression 
due to asymmetric information between training and outside firms, and assume that training is completely general. 
In the figures, we assume that the share of low-ability workers is 0.5, and that the productivity of low-ability work-
ers is 1. The dispersion of the utility shock is set to 0.4 (which is close to our baseline estimate; see Table 3). In 
panel A, we set the productivity of high-ability workers to 2.75 (which is again close to our baseline estimate, see 
Table 3). See Section IIIA or the functional forms of the production and cost functions, as well as the chosen form 
of the distribution of utility shocks.
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A. setup
There are two periods, the first period is the training period. There are many work-
ers and firms, both are risk-neutral. Firms maximize expected profits, and workers 
maximize expected utility. The worker’s productivity y in training and outside firms 
in period 2 depends on her ability, η; the amount (or quality) of on-the-job training 
received in period 1, τ; and the degree of firm-specificity of training, α: 
  y = {  h(τ)η   (training firm), and    αh(τ)η     (outside firm). 
We assume that h(τ) is concave in τ and that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α = 0, training is purely 
firm-specific. If, in contrast, α = 1, training is purely general. The parameter α is 
therefore a measure for the transferability of training. Throughout the paper, we 
treat α as exogenous; hence, firms and workers cannot choose between investing 
in general or specific skills.7 In this production function, ability and training are 
complements, i.e., training increases the productivity of high-ability workers more 
than that of low-ability workers. This is necessary for asymmetric information to 
provide an incentive for firms to finance training. Note that in this model, workers 
receive training for one period (e.g., one year). Hence, τ measures how much train-
ing workers receive during this period and is therefore best understood as a measure 
for the quality of training.
Workers are either of low or high ability. The share of low-ability workers in the 
economy is common knowledge, and denoted by p. We assume that the expected 
productivity of untrained workers is the same as that of workers in training, and 
given by  y 0 . Training costs are denoted by c(τ), with c′(τ) > 0, and c′′(τ) ≥ 0. In 
the first period, neither firms nor workers observe the worker’s ability. In the second 
period, only training firms get to know the worker’s ability, whereas outside firms 
receive no new information about it. Outside firms do observe the training intensity 
that the worker has received, however.
After training is completed, workers may either stay with or leave the training 
firm. We endogenize mobility in a simple way and assume that during the training 
period workers experience a utility shock θ. This shock captures the worker’s ex 
post evaluation of his or her work environment. For instance, it could reflect how 
workers like their co-workers. Only workers, but not firms, observe θ. The worker’s 
utility in period 2 at the training firm is the sum of her wage, w, and her utility from 
nonpecuniary job characteristics, θ. A worker’s utility at outside firms is equal to the 
wage offer of outside firms. The utility shock is drawn from a distribution with the 
cumulative distribution function g, with associated pdf g, and support [ _ θ,  _ θ],  _ θ > 0, 
where g belongs to the family of log-concave distribution functions.
7 A justification for this assumption is that the production technology is likely to be fixed in the short- and 
medium run. The partial transferability of training can also be motivated by the skill-weight approach of Lazear 
(2009). According to this approach, skills and hence training are fully general. However, since firms differ with 
respect to the weights they place on each skill, training is more valuable in the training firm than in outside firms.
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We assume that wages are determined in spot markets and rule out long-term 
wage contracts. In the second period, outside firms simultaneously make wage 
offers to workers by maximizing expected profits. Training firms observe the outside 
offer, and make a counter offer. We further impose the standard free entry condition 
on firms: No firm earns positive profits in the long run.
To summarize, the exact timing of events is as follows:
	 • At the beginning of period 1, firms decide how much training to offer to 
workers and offer workers an apprenticeship wage. At this point, they do not 
know the ability of workers.
	 • Training takes place.
	 • At the end of period 1, the training firm finds out the ability of each worker.
	 • At the beginning of period 2, outside firms make a wage offer to workers. They 
observe the training intensity that the worker has received, but not her ability.
	 • Training firms observe the worker’s (best) outside offer, and make a 
counteroffer.
	 • Workers discover their utility shock and decide whether to stay or quit.
We analyze the model under two assumptions. Under the first assumption, train-
ing is verifiable and training contracts are enforceable. Hence, firms can commit 
to training provision. Under the second assumption, training is not verifiable and 
training contracts are not enforceable. Hence, firms are unable to commit to training 
provision. Note that, as it is standard in the literature, we assume in both cases that 
training is observable by outside firms.8 We investigate the firm’s decision whether 
or not to commit to training provision in Section IC.
B. Analysis
Wage determination in the second period.—We begin with wage determination 
in the second period. While the amount of training offered in the first period depends 
on whether firms can or cannot commit to training provision, the rules for wage deter-
mination do not. Let v denote the wage offer of outside firms, and w the wage offer of 
training firms. A worker stays with her training firm if the wage offer of the training 
firm w plus the utility shock θ exceeds her outside wage offer v. Hence, the probabil-
ity that the worker stays with the training firm is given by Pr(stay) = Pr(w + θ > v) 
= 1 − g(v − w).
Training firms observe the worker’s ability and therefore offer different wages to 
low- and high-ability workers. From now onward, we therefore index wage offers 
8 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999b); Autor (2001); and Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003) all 
assume that training is observable but nonverifiable.
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of training firms by ability (i  =  L, h). Taking workers’ outside offers and the first 
period training choice as given, training firms maximize
   max  w i   (1 − g (v −  w i )) (h (τ)  η i −  w i ),   i = L, h.
From the first-order condition, wage offers of training firms are implicitly defined as
(1)   w i = h (τ)  η i −  1 − g (v −  w i )  __ g (v −  w i )  ,   i = L, h.
Outside firms, in contrast, do not observe the worker’s ability and therefore offer 
the same wage to low- and high-ability workers. Due to perfect competition, outside 
wages are equal to the expected productivity of those workers who leave the training 
firm. Low-ability workers are more likely to switch firms, and wage offers of outside 
firms reflect this adverse selection:9
(2) v = 
E [αh (τ)  η i | move] =  pg (v −  w L )(αh (τ))  η L + (1 − p) g (v −  w h )(αh (τ))  η h      ____pg (v −  w L ) + (1 − p) g (v −  w h )  .
The log-concavity of g ensures that the first order conditions given by equation 
(1) are sufficient for a maximum, and that for given levels of τ,  w L ,  w h, and v are 
uniquely determined (see Schönberg 2007 for a formal proof).10
Training provision.—Next, we turn to the firm’s decision to train in the first period. 
Suppose first that firms can commit to a training provision. Under this assump-
tion, firms choose training by maximizing expected profits subject to the constraint 
that workers are offered a utility at least as high as that received by outside firms. 
Otherwise, firms will not be able to attract any workers. This maximization problem 
corresponds to the maximization of the worker’s utility subject to the zero profit 
constraint (see also Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b):
   max τ  W + u (τ) s.t. Π (τ) − c (τ) − W = 0.
Here, W denotes the training wage, u denotes the worker’s expected utility in the 
second period, and Π denotes the firm’s expected profit in the second period. The 
training wage W is determined by the free-entry condition and thus bid up to the 
point where firms make zero expected profits, W = Π(τ) − c(τ). Substituting this 
9 Note that because outside wages are equal to expected productivity, “poaching externalities” as discussed in 
Stevens (1994b) are absent in our model.
10 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) set up a similar model of asymmetric information between training and outside 
firms and show that their model may exhibit multiple equilibria. In an extension to their basic model, Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998) point out that if the timing of events is the same as in our model (i.e., outside firms make a wage 
offer to trained workers and training firms make a counter offer), the equilibrium is unique.
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into the maximization problem, the chosen training intensity under commitment, 
τ c , satisfies
(3)   ∂ Π ( τ c ) _∂ τ  +  
∂u ( τ c ) _∂ τ  =  
∂c ( τ c ) _∂ τ  .
Under commitment to training provision, the training intensity chosen by the firm 
equates the firm’s and worker’s joint return to training (left-hand side) with the mar-
ginal cost of training (right-hand side). Notice that this is also the socially optimal 
training intensity that maximizes total welfare in the economy.
Contrast this with the case of no commitment to training provision, where train-
ing contracts are not enforceable. In this case, training firms may initially promise 
trainees a certain training intensity, but later renege on this promise and provide 
a different training intensity. Now suppose at the beginning of the training period 
firms offer workers the socially optimal training intensity  τ c . However, workers do 
not perceive this training intensity as credible, as firms can increase their profits by 
providing a different training intensity. The only training intensity workers consider 
credible is the one that maximizes the firm’s future profit. The training intensity 
chosen by the firm under no commitment,  τ Nc , therefore equates the marginal cost 
of training with the firm’s private return to training:
(4)   ∂ Π ( τ Nc ) _∂ τ  =  
∂c ( τ Nc ) _∂ τ  .
Equation (4) highlights that under the no commitment to training provision, firms pro-
vide training only if the firm’s expected profit is increasing in training, i.e., ∂ Π/∂ τ > 0. 
This is what Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b) refer to as wage compression. In 
Appendix A, we show that in our model wage compression arises due to firm-specific 
training and asymmetric information between training and outside firms.
Comparing the training intensity under no commitment (equation (4)) and com-
mitment (equation (3)), it is apparent that firms provide more training under com-
mitment ( τ c >  τ Nc ). Hence, under no commitment to training provision, training 
is below the socially optimal level. The reason is that under no commitment, firms 
choose training by maximizing their private return to training, while under com-
mitment, training is chosen by maximizing the firm’s and worker’s joint return to 
training. Equations (3) and (4) further highlight that training intensity under no com-
mitment is closer to the socially optimal training intensity, as provided under com-
mitment to training provision, the larger wage compression is. Figure 1 illustrates 
this. In panel A, we compare the training intensities under commitment and no com-
mitment predicted by our model for increasing levels of wage compression due to 
firm-specific human capital accumulation, assuming that there are no informational 
asymmetries between training and outside firms (i.e., we assume that  η L =  η h ). If 
training is completely general (i.e., α = 1), the training intensity under no com-
mitment is zero, while the training intensity under commitment equates the mar-
ginal productivity and the marginal cost of training (i.e., ∂ h(τ)η/∂ τ  = ∂c(τ)/∂ τ). 
In this case, the difference between the two training intensities is largest. If, in 
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contrast, training is completely firm-specific (i.e., α = 0), the training intensity 
under no commitment approaches, for the chosen parameter values, 85 percent of 
that under commitment.
In panel B, we compare the training intensities in the two scenarios for increas-
ing levels of wage compression due to asymmetric information, now assuming that 
training is completely general. If the productivity of low-ability workers is the same 
as that of high-ability workers (i.e.,  η L =  η h ), the training intensity under no com-
mitment to training provision is zero, and the difference between the training inten-
sities under commitment and no commitment to training provision is largest. If, in 
contrast, the productivity of high-ability workers is five times larger than that of 
low-ability workers, the ratio between the two training intensities is, for the chosen 
parameter values, 65 percent.11
Who pays for Training: Workers or firms?—Who bears the training costs under 
no commitment and under commitment, firms or workers? Under both commitment 
and no commitment to training provision, apprenticeship wages are bid up until 
firms’ expected profits are equal to zero:  W j =  y 0 + Π( τ j ) − c( τ j ). Untrained work-
ers receive a first period wage equal to their productivity plus the firms’ expected 
second period profit in the absence of training:  y 0 + Π(0).
Under no commitment, firms choose training by maximizing expected profits (see 
equation (4) for the first order condition). In the absence of wage compression, no 
training takes place. With wage compression, profits with training are higher than prof-
its without training: Π( τ Nc ) − c( τ Nc ) > Π(0) > 0. Consequently, as apprenticeship 
wages and wages of untrained workers are bid up until firms’ expected profits are equal 
to zero, apprenticeship wages exceed wages of untrained workers as well as the produc-
tivity of apprentices,  y 0 , and firms bear all the training costs.12 This reflects that under 
no commitment workers are not willing to accept a wage cut to finance training.
In contrast, under commitment, firms choose training by maximizing the workers’ 
utility subject to the zero profit constraint (see equation (3) for the first order condi-
tion). In the absence of wage compression, the firm’s profit in the second period with 
training equals that without training (Π( τ c ) = Π(0)). Consequently, apprenticeship 
wages are lower than wages of untrained workers by the amount of the training costs 
c( τ c ), and apprentices bear all the training costs. With wage compression, 
Π( τ c ) > Π(0). Therefore, the difference between apprenticeship wages and wages of 
untrained workers is less than the training costs, so that firms and workers share the 
training costs.
This suggests a possible way to distinguish between commitment and no com-
mitment. Under no commitment, apprenticeship wages exceed wages of untrained 
workers and the productivity of apprentices, while under commitment, apprenticeship 
11 In the figure, we assume that the share of low-ability workers is 0.5, and that their productivity is 1. The 
dispersion of the utility shock is 0.4 (which is close to our baseline estimate; see Table 3). In panel A, we set 
the productivity of high-ability workers to 2.75 (which is again close to our baseline estimate, see Table 3). See 
Section IIA for the functional forms of the production and cost functions, as well as the chosen form of the distribu-
tion of utility shocks.
12 Note that if the productivity of workers in training is below that of untrained workers (implying that there is a 
fixed cost of training), then apprenticeship wages may be below those of untrained workers (but above the produc-
tivity of apprentices), and firms and workers may share the total costs of training.
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wages may be below wages of untrained workers and the productivity of apprentices. 
However, this stark conclusion depends on our assumption that apprentices are as 
productive as untrained workers. If, as it is likely, apprentices are less productive than 
untrained workers, then apprenticeship wages may be lower than wages of untrained 
workers, even under no commitment. In this case, the ratio between the apprenticeship 
wage and the wage of untrained workers will ceteris paribus be higher under no com-
mitment than under commitment to training provision. A further distinguishing feature 
between the two scenarios is that under no commitment apprenticeship wages exceed 
the productivity of apprentices, whereas under commitment they may be below the 
productivity of apprentices. In Section IIIA, we will compare apprenticeship wages, 
wages of untrained workers, and the productivity of apprentices to infer the ability of 
firms to commit to training provision in the United Kingdom and Germany.
C. commitment to Training provision and Time inconsistency
So far, we have treated the firm’s ability to commit to training provision as exoge-
nous. We now discuss the determinants of that decision. Assume first that firms expect 
to be in the training market for two periods only. Recall that the training intensity and 
apprenticeship wage combination that maximizes total welfare, i.e., the sum of work-
ers’ utilities and firms’ profits, are those under commitment,  τ c and  W c . Consequently, 
if the firm offers any training-apprenticeship wage combination other than  τ c and  W c 
that does not maximize the worker’s and firm’s joint welfare, firms and workers will be 
able to come up with a private agreement that makes both parties better off. However, 
once workers have accepted the training offer, firms have an incentive to deviate from 
the promised training intensity  τ c , and offer the training intensity that maximizes their 
own, as opposed to the joint, return to training. From equation (4), this is the one under 
no commitment,  τ Nc . This is a typical time inconsistency problem.
If training is verifiable in court, and training contracts are enforceable, then devi-
ating firms will be detected and punished. This eliminates the time-inconsistency 
problem, provided that the expected punishment (left-hand side) exceeds the gain 
from reneging on the promised training intensity (right-hand side):
  q ⋅ p = (Π ( τ Nc ) − c ( τ Nc )) − (Π ( τ c ) − c ( τ c )).
Here, q denotes the probability that a firm that does not deliver the promised training 
intensity will be detected; and p is the punishment in case of detection. As training 
takes place within firms, it simply may be too complex to be specified in a contract in a 
way that is legally enforceable, and thus not be verifiable. One solution to this problem 
is external regulation of apprenticeship training, which may help to detect firms that 
do not deliver the promised training intensity and impose fines on these firms, leading 
to enforceable training contracts and enabling firms to commit to training provision.
Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) also point out that a successful apprenticeship sys-
tem may require external regulation. Their explanation is, however, different from ours. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) analyze their model under no commitment to training 
provision and focus on the external certification of skills. In their model, certification 
allows outside firms to observe whether the worker has received some training, which 
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in turn forces outside and training firms to pay higher wages to trained workers than to 
untrained workers. This then provides an incentive for workers to exert effort during 
training, which, in Acemoglu and Piscke’s model, is necessary for training to be pro-
ductive. In our model, in contrast, outside firms are able to observe training regardless 
of whether they are able to commit to training provision. Observability of training is, 
however, not sufficient to ensure that training contracts are legally enforceable. We 
argue that external apprenticeship regulation makes training contracts legally enforce-
able, and thereby enables firms to commit to training provision.
If firms live for multiple periods (and workers for only two periods), firms have, 
in principle, an incentive to build up a reputation for providing high-quality training 
above that offered under no commitment, even in the absence of external regula-
tion, which ensures the verifiability of training. Market forces may therefore be 
strong enough to ensure that firms commit to training provision. However, whether 
firms are indeed able to develop a reputation for providing high-quality training cru-
cially depends, among other things, on the information potential trainees have about 
the training intensities that firms have provided in the past. External regulation of 
apprenticeship training may transmit this type of information to potential trainees, 
and hence facilitate commitment to training provision. We discuss apprenticeship 
regulation in detail in Section IIIB.
II. Model Calibration
In our model, the training intensity under no commitment is unambiguously lower 
than the socially optimal training intensity under commitment to training provision, 
and the difference between the two training intensities is larger the lower wage com-
pression is. In this section, we quantify how much lower training intensities are in the 
no-commitment than in the commitment case. To this end, we calibrate our model 
for parameter values consistent with the levels of wage compression observed in the 
data, which we estimate from administrative and survey data for Germany. We then 
compare the training intensity under the commitment and the no-commitment case.
A. choice of parameter Values
For our calibration, we first need to impose functional forms on the production- 
and cost technology, as well as on the distribution of utility shocks. For the produc-
tion and cost technology, we assume that h(τ) = (1 + τ) and c(τ) = 0.5 τ 2 .13 We 
further assume that utility shocks θ are drawn from a logistic distribution with mean 
0 and scale parameter b, i.e., g(θ) = 1/(1 +  e −θ/b ). We normalize the share of low-
ability workers to p = 0.5 and the productivity of low-ability workers to  η L = 1.14 
This leaves three parameters to be determined: α (the degree of transferability of 
13 We have repeated the simulation exercise for two alternative specifications of the production and cost technol-
ogy: h(τ) = (1 +  τ 1/2 ) and c(τ) = 1/3 τ 3 . Our results are robust to these alternative functional forms.
14 We have repeated the simulation exercise for two alternative values: p = 0.25 and p = 0.75. Our overall 
conclusions are unchanged.
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training),  η h (the productivity of high-ability workers), and b (the scale parameter 
of the logistic distribution of utility shocks).
The degree of transferability of training, α, captures wage compression due to 
firm-specific human capital in our model. From Figure 1, panel A, the lower α, the 
larger the wage compression due to firm-specific human capital, and the smaller the 
difference between the training intensity under no commitment and commitment to 
training provision. We choose α using direct information about the applicability of 
apprenticeship skills from the german Qualification and career survey using the 
1979, 1985, and 1992 waves. In these waves, workers are asked about the propor-
tion of skills acquired during apprenticeship training that are applicable at their cur-
rent job. Survey responses are categorical, distinguishing between very much, a lot, 
some, not too much, and very little. We quantify the extent to which human capital 
is specific rather than general by assigning to the five categories the values 90, 75, 
50, 25, and 10.15 Our analysis is based on men in West Germany who completed an 
apprenticeship and are between 18 and 55 years old.
In panel A of Table 1, we report estimates for the degree of transferability of 
apprenticeship training separately by firm size. We compare the applicability of 
skills for four groups of workers: workers who are still employed in the appren-
ticeship firm and occupation, workers who left the apprenticeship firm but are still 
employed in the apprenticeship occupation, workers who switched occupations but 
are still employed in the apprenticeship firm, and workers who left both the appren-
ticeship firm and occupation.16 Our results pooled for all firms (column 1) indicate 
that workers who left the apprenticeship firm but not the apprenticeship occupation 
can employ 4.40 percent less of their skills than a worker who is still employed at 
the apprenticeship firm and occupation. The corresponding number is 8.8 percent 
for workers who are still employed at the training firm, but left the training occupa-
tion, and 34.6 percent for workers who have left both the training occupation and 
the training firm.17 Hence, the firm-specific component of apprenticeship training 
is small, around 5 percent. In panel B of Table 1, we display our estimates for the 
degree of the transferability of skills, α. Our baseline estimate, pooled for all firms, 
for α is 0.956 (1 − 0.044).
The productivity of high-ability ability workers,  η h , captures wage compression 
due to asymmetric information in our model. From Figure 1, panel B, the larger  η h , 
the larger the wage compression due to asymmetric information and the smaller the 
difference between the training intensity under no commitment and commitment 
to training provision. The larger the scale parameter of the logistic distribution of 
utility shocks, b, the more workers quit the firm after training. This in turn reduces 
15 Our results are similar if we assign the values 95, 80, 50, 20, and 5 or 85, 70, 50, 30, and 15.
16 Occupational mobility is defined at the 2-digit level which distinguishes between 93 occupations. Our regres-
sions control for the year the apprenticeship ended, experience and its square, firm size, apprenticeship occupation 
(20 occupations), high school degree (Abitur), and age at end of apprenticeship.
17 In related research, Fitzenberger and Spitz-Öner (2004) and Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) conclude that 
the specificity of training does not prevent apprentices from switching occupations. They find that occupational 
switches are frequent, and are likely to occur in order to realize better wage and career prospects. Winkelmann 
(1996) notes the low retention rates of apprentices after training, and concludes that apprentices acquire predomi-
nantly portable skills.
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the firm’s return to training, ∂ Π/∂ τ, and, consequently, the difference between the 
training intensities under commitment and no commitment to training provision.18
We obtain estimates for  η h and b by matching two data moments, the quit rate 
after training, and the wage differential between workers who (initially) stay with or 
move away from the training firm, to respective moments generated by our model.
The quit rate after training in our model is given by
   q m = p (1 − g (v −  w L )) + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h )).
The stayer-mover wage differential in our model is s m m = E[w | stay] − 
v/E[w | stay], where
  E [w | stay] =  p (1 − g (v −  w L ))  w L + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h ))  w h      _____
p (1 − g (v −  w L )) + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h ))  ,
and  w L ,  w h , and v are given by equations (1) and (2). Both  q m and s m m are com-
plicated functions of b and  η h . We compute these model moments for a fine grid of 
values for b and  η h , using our estimate for the degree of transferability of appren-
ticeship skills, α. Let  q d and s m d denote the corresponding data moments. We 
18 A figure that plots the training intensities under commitment and no commitment to training provision pre-
dicted by our model against b, for constant values of α and  η h is available on request.
Table 1—The Transferability of Apprenticeship Skills
By size of apprenticeship firm
All <10 10–49 50–499 >499
panel A. The specificity of apprenticeship skills
Firm mover, occ. stayer −0.044 −0.064 −0.045 −0.045 −0.047
(0.004)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.010)**
Firm stayer, occ. mover −0.088 −0.078 −0.051 −0.060 −0.115
(0.007)** (0.002)** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.012)**
Firm mover, occ. mover −0.346 −0.408 −0.343 −0.303 −0.316
(0.004)** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.010)**
panel B. share of training that is general (α)
Firm mover, occ. stayer 0.956 0.936 0.955 0.955 0.953
Notes: In panel A, we report estimates for the specificity of apprenticeship training by firm size, where we distin-
guish between firm movers and occupation stayers, firm stayers and occupation movers, as well as firm and occupa-
tion movers. The base category are workers who are still employed at their apprenticeship firm and apprenticeship 
occupation. The dependent variable is the proportion of skills obtained during apprenticeship training that is appli-
cable at the current job. We control for the year the apprenticeship ended, experience, experience squared, size of the 
apprenticeship firm (4 categories), apprenticeship occupation (19 categories), age at the end of the apprenticeship, 
and type of high school. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In panel B, we report our estimate for the degree of 
transferability of apprenticeship training, α.
source: German Qualification and Career Survey, waves 1 to 3, West German men who completed an apprentice-
ship. Observations = 24, 828.
VoL. 4 No. 2 49dusTmANN ANd schÖNBErg: firm-BAsEd VocATioNAL TrAiNiNg schEmEs
then pick those values for b and  η h that minimize the sum of the squared distance 
between the model and the data moments:
(5)   min 
b,  η h 
 ( q m (b,  η h ) −  q d ) 2 + (s m m (b,  η h ) − s m d ) 2 .
We estimate the quit rate ( q d ) and the stayer-mover wage differential (s m d ) using 
data from the IABS 1975–2001, a 2 percent sample of administrative social secu-
rity records. We restrict the sample to men in West Germany who finished the 
apprenticeship between 1980 (this restriction ensures that we observe the size of 
the apprenticeship firm) and 1998 (this restriction ensures that every apprentice is 
observed for at least three years).
The first row in Table 2 shows that overall about 36 percent of apprentices leave 
the apprenticeship firm after apprenticeship completion. The quit rate declines 
substantially with firm size. It is 44.76 percent in training firms with less than 
10 employees, but only 25.54 percent in firms with more than 500 employees. In 
the second row of Table 2, we display the wage differential between workers who 
stay with the apprenticeship firm (“stayers”) and those who leave the apprenticeship 
firm (“movers”). Our regressions control for the worker’s age at the beginning of the 
apprenticeship, apprenticeship duration, high school degree (Abitur), foreign status, 
as well as the industry and the size of the apprenticeship firm. Overall, stayers earn 
3.6 percent higher wages than movers. There is, again, substantial heterogeneity by 
the size of the apprenticeship firm. In firms with less than 10 employees, movers 
earn 2.2 percent higher wages than stayers. In firms with at least 500 employees, in 
contrast, movers earn 12.7 percent lower wages than stayers.19
Note that the model moments can be computed either under the assumption of com-
mitment to training provision or under the opposite assumption of no commitment to 
training provision. Since training firms in Germany are likely to be able to commit 
to training provision (see Section IIIB for empirical evidence), we calculate in our 
19 See e.g., Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) and von Wachter and Bender (2006) for similar results.
Table 2—Data Moments: Quit Rate and the Mover-Stayer Wage Differential
By size of apprenticeship firm
All firms <10 10–49 50–499 >499
Quit rate 35.86% 44.74% 38.27% 32.30% 25.51%
Stayer-mover 0.036 −0.022 0.027 0.058 0.127
 wage differential (0.003)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.007)**
Observations 43,996 11,530 12,470 10,922 9,074
Notes: We first report the share of workers who leave the training firm after training completion. We then display 
the wage advantage of stayers after apprenticeship training. Our regressions control for citizenship, age at the begin-
ning of apprenticeship, apprenticeship duration, high school degree (Abitur), 16 apprenticeship industry dummies, 
and the size of apprenticeship firm (4 dummies). We first show results pooled for all firms, and then separately by 
the size of the apprenticeship firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
source: IAB Social Security Records, men in the West German labor market who completed an apprenticeship 
between 1980 and 1998.
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baseline results the model moment under the assumption of commitment to training 
provision. For robustness, we also compute the model moments under the opposite 
assumption of no commitment to training provision. We then compare the training 
intensity under the two scenarios, and report the ratio between the two,  τ Nc / τ c .
B. results
In Table 3, we report the values for the productivity of high-ability workers ( η h ), 
and the scale parameter of the distribution of nonpecuniary job characteristics (b), 
that minimize the squared distance between the data and the model moments (see 
equation (5)). The model moments are first calculated under the assumption that all 
firms commit to training provision (panel A), and then, under the opposite assump-
tion, that no firm commits to training provision (panel B). In both cases, we are able 
to fit the data moments almost perfectly.
Notice that the productivity of high-ability workers,  η h , increases with firm size, 
regardless of how the model moments are obtained. This is because the stayer-mover 
wage differential is larger in larger training firms, while the degree of transferability 
is roughly similar across firms of different sizes. Hence, our model attributes the 
larger wage disadvantage of movers in large training firms to a higher degree of 
asymmetric information in these firms. This is reasonable, as the production tech-
nology in large firms is likely to be more sensitive to ability than that in small firms. 
Moreover, the scale parameter of the distribution of utility shocks, b, decreases with 
firm size. This is because the quit rate after apprenticeship training is higher in 
smaller training firms.
Table 3—Data Moments and the Productivity of High-Ability Workers and the Scale Parameter of 
the Distribution of Utility Shocks (Baseline)
Dispersion Productivity Ratio training
utility shocks (b) high-ability (  η h ) NoCom/Com
panel A. model moments are computed under commitment
All firms 0.45 2.46 28.3%
Small firms (1–9) 0.56 2.14 13.5%
Medium-sized firms (10–49) 0.47 2.39 24.8%
Medium-sized firms (50–499) 0.41 2.71 38.5%
Large firms (>499) 0.38 5.10 56.1%
panel B. model moments are computed under no commitment
All firms 0.44 3.01 43.6%
Small firms (1–9) 0.55 2.81 34.8%
Medium-sized firms (10–49) 0.46 2.96 41.5%
Medium-sized firms (50–499) 0.40 3.19 47.8%
Large firms (>499) 0.36 5.18 66.8%
Notes: The table first displays the model parameter values for the productivity of high-ability workers ( ηh ) and 
the scale parameter of the distribution of utility shocks (b). These parameter values are chosen by minimizing the 
squared distance between the quit rate and stayer-mover wage differential observed in the data (see Table 2) and 
their model counterparts. We obtain the model moments first under the assumption that all firms commit to train-
ing provision (Com, panel A), and then, under the opposite assumption, that no firm commits to training provision 
(NoCom, panel B). See Table 1, panel B for our estimates for the degree of transferability of apprenticeship train-
ing, α. For each set of parameter values, we display the ratio of the training intensities under no commitment and 
commitment to training provision predicted by our model.
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How much lower is training under no commitment than under commitment? In the 
final column of Table 3, we report the ratio between the training intensities,  τ Nc / τ c . 
According to our baseline estimate, which computes the model moments under the 
assumption of commitment to training provision (Table 3, panel A), the training inten-
sity under no commitment is 28.3 percent of that under commitment. This compares 
to 43.6 percent when model moments are calculated under the opposite assumption 
of no commitment to training provision. There is considerable heterogeneity by firm 
size. In training firms with less than 10 employees, the ratios between the training 
intensities under no commitment and commitment are 13.5 percent and 34.8 percent, 
respectively. For large firms with more than 500 employees training under no commit-
ment is 56.1 percent and 66.8 percent under commitment.
Our model allows for only three reasons why wages of movers differ from wages 
of stayers: firm-specific training, asymmetric information, and nonpecuniary job 
characteristics. Differences in wages of stayers and movers may additionally reflect 
differences in occupation-specific training, differences in search capital, or differ-
ences in the productivity of the training firms. In Appendix B, we argue that our key 
conclusion—i.e., that the lack of commitment results in substantially lower training 
intensities—is robust to these extensions.
So far, we have inferred wage compression indirectly by exploiting informa-
tion on the applicability of apprenticeship skills, and by matching key model 
moments—the stayer-mover wage differential and the quit rate after apprentice-
ship training—to their model counterparts. In principle, we could measure wage 
compression directly by comparing the effect of training on wages with that on 
productivity. While there are no studies that conduct such an analysis for appren-
ticeship training, several studies do so for on-the-job training. A typical estimate 
suggests that the increase in wages due to training is only about 50 percent of 
the increase in productivity (see e.g., Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2006; 
Conti 2005; Konings and Vanormelingen 2009), although the hypotheses that the 
increase is the same typically cannot be rejected. According to our baseline esti-
mates (α = 0.956,  η h = 2.46, b = 0.45, see Table 3, panel A), our model predicts 
that the wage increase due to training is roughly 68 percent of the productivity 
increase due to training. This is not too far off the estimates of wage compression 
presented in these papers, and implies that the training intensity under no commit-
ment is only 28 percent of that under commitment. For the parameters calibrated 
to fit the stayer-mover wage differential and the quit rate in large firms, our model 
predicts that the wage increase due to training is only 34 percent of the productivity 
increase due to training, which corresponds to a larger level of wage compression 
(and thus to a higher ratio between the training intensity under commitment and no 
commitment to training provision) than that reported in the literature we cite above. 
Yet, the training intensity under no commitment to training provision is only 60 
percent of that under commitment to training provision.
We therefore conclude that, for reasonable levels of wage compression consis-
tent with those observed in the data, the training intensity under no commitment 
is substantially lower than that under commitment to training provision. Note 
that this will result in lower enrollment rates into training schemes if there are 
fixed costs of training and workers are ex ante heterogeneous. While we have 
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not explicitly modeled this, a particularly simple way to do so is to allow for het-
erogenous fixed costs of training, reflecting for instance workers’ motivation to 
undergo training. To see this, let  f i denote these fixed costs, and assume that  f i is 
drawn from a distribution with cdf h(.). Workers prefer training over no training 
if their utility with training,  W j + u( τ j ) −  f i , j = c, Nc, exceeds their utility 
without training,  W 0 + u( τ 0 ):
  [ W j + u ( τ j )] − [ W 0 + u (0)] >  f i,   j = c, Nc.
There is a threshold  f *j , j = c, Nc, such that all workers with a fixed cost below 
f *j choose to be trained, while all workers with a fixed cost above  f *j prefer not to 
be trained. Since workers’ utility with training is higher in the commitment than 
in the no commitment case (i.e.,  W c + u( τ c ) >  W Nc + u( τ Nc )), the threshold 
is higher in the commitment than in the no commitment case (i.e.,  f *Nc <  f *c ). 
Consequently, enrollment into training schemes is higher under commitment than 
under no commitment to training provision: h( f *Nc ) < h( f *c ).
III. Discussion and Policy Implications
A. is commitment to Training provision Lower in the  
united Kingdom than in germany?
Could commitment therefore be the key element to understand why firm-based 
apprenticeship training schemes are less successful in countries other than Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland? In this section, we provide evidence that is in line with 
this hypothesis, focusing on the United Kingdom. The first piece of evidence that 
commitment to training provision is likely to be more problematic in the United 
Kingdom than in Germany is the low quality of apprenticeship training, which is 
a prime concern in the United Kingdom (see e.g., Ryan and Unwin 2001; Ryan, 
Gospel, and Lewis 2007).20 The low quality of training could also be responsible 
for the low enrollment rates in apprenticeship programs. The percentage of 16–18 
year olds that participate in work-based learning decreased from 9.3 percent in 2000 
to 6.4 percent in 2009.21 A further indication of the low quality of apprenticeship 
training in the United Kingdom is the high dropout rates (see row 1 of Table 4). In 
2002, 76 percent of apprentices did not complete the apprenticeship program. By 
2005, this number declined to 47 percent (Lewis and Ryan 2009; Adult Learning 
Inspectorate 2006). The corresponding numbers in Germany are 23.4 percent in 2002 
and 19.4 percent in 2005, respectively (Berufsbildungsbericht 2006, 2007).22 Our 
20 The fifth report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2007) also identifies the low 
quality as a main problem of the UK apprenticeship program. Similar concerns are voiced in the UK government 
commissioned “Wolf Report” (Wolf 2011), which gives a damning verdict on the quality of vocational education.
21 See Department for Education http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000938/index.shtml.
22 The evidence for other Anglo-Saxon countries points in a similar direction. Dropout rates range from 63 per-
cent in the United States to 52 percent in Australia, and 39 percent in Canada (see table 10 in National Centre for 
Vocational Education Research (2009) for Australia, table 5 in Sharpe and Gibson (2005) for Canada; the number 
for the United States refers to the construction sector for apprentices who enrolled in the program in 1998 (United 
VoL. 4 No. 2 53dusTmANN ANd schÖNBErg: firm-BAsEd VocATioNAL TrAiNiNg schEmEs
interpretation of the low quality of apprenticeship training in the United Kingdom 
(and other Anglo-Saxon countries) is that workers obtain the training intensity under 
no commitment,  τ Nc , instead of the higher one under commitment,  τ c .
Recall from Section IB that a further indication of the lack of commitment to train-
ing provision is a high ratio between apprenticeship wages and wages of untrained 
workers. Table 4, row 2 shows that this ratio is more than twice as high in the United 
Kingdom than in Germany (0.914 versus 0.438).23 A further difference between 
commitment and no commitment to training provision is that under no commitment 
apprenticeship wages exceed the productivity of apprentices, whereas under com-
mitment they may be below the productivity of apprentices. We investigate this in 
row 3 of Table 4. Here, we first report the mean difference between the annual pro-
ductivity and the annual earnings of apprentices in three-year apprenticeship pro-
grams in Germany in the private sector. We base our analysis on a survey dataset, 
the german Apprenticeship Training survey, and construct an annual productivity 
measure.24 Overall, the productivity of apprentices somewhat exceeds the earnings 
of apprentices. Comparable data for the United Kingdom exists for the construc-
tion sector, which is also the sector that trains the most apprentices in the United 
Kingdom (38 percent in 2002–2004, based on the British Labor Force Survey). In 
Germany, the productivity of apprentices in this sector exceeds their earnings by 
States Government Accountability Office 2005)). Sharpe (1999) provides additional evidence for low completion 
rates in Canada.
23 Steedman (2008) provides additional evidence that England has far higher apprenticeship wages than conti-
nental countries with well-functioning, firm-based training systems, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. In 
Australia, the ratio between the apprenticeship wage and the wage of unexperienced untrained workers is around 
87 percent (derived from Bittman et al. 2007). Lynch (1993) also reports that the ratio between apprenticeship 
wages and adult untrained wages is much higher in the United States than in Germany.
24 See Beicht, Walden, and Herget (2004) for more details.
Table 4—Apprenticeship Training in the United Kingdom and (West) Germany
UK Germany
(1) Dropout rates
2002 76% 23.5%
2005 47% 19.4%
(2) Ratio apprenticeship wages and wages of inexperienced unskilled workers
 (Median, 2002–2004) 0.914 0.438
(3) Productivity of apprentices minus apprenticeship wage
 All sectors (3-year apprenticeship occupations) €: 324.07
 Construction £: −2,800 €: 557.86
Notes: The first row compares the shares of apprentices who do not complete the apprenticeship program in West 
Germany and the United Kingdom. The numbers for the United Kingdom are taken from Lewis and Ryan (2007), 
and the numbers for Germany from the Federal Education Report (Bundesbildungsbericht) for the years 2006 and 
2007. In the second row, we show the ratio between the median wage of apprentices and that of inexperienced 
unskilled employees, which we define as employees below the age of 20 who left full-time education at age 16 
and are employed full-time. The numbers are our own calculations based on the British Labor Force Survey and 
the IAB Employment Sample. In the third row, we report the difference between the productivity of apprentices 
and the apprenticeship wage in the construction sector. The numbers for the United Kingdom (in pounds) are taken 
from Hogarth and Hasluck (2003). The numbers for Germany (in Euros) are own calculations based on the German 
Apprenticeship Survey.
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558 Euros, which is similar to the difference for all sectors. In the United Kingdom, 
in contrast, the earnings of apprentices exceeds their productivity by £2,800.
To sum up, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that apprentices in Germany are more 
willing to accept a wage cut to finance training than apprentices in the United Kingdom, 
which they are only willing to do if firms are able to commit to training provision.
B. Apprenticeship regulation and commitment to Training provision
A key question is which policies encourage commitment to training provision? And 
why is commitment to training provision likely to be lower in the United Kingdom 
and other Anglo-Saxon countries than in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland? We 
offer one possible explanation. The apprenticeship system in the German-speaking 
countries is highly institutionalized and externally regulated, whereas the systems in 
Anglo-Saxon countries are more market driven. We now describe the regulation of 
apprenticeship training in Germany and contrast it with that in other Anglo-Saxon 
countries, focusing on the United Kingdom.25
Most importantly, in Germany the Vocational Training Act provides appren-
tices with the right to take legal action if the apprenticeship firm consistently 
violates its obligations (e.g., if apprentices consistently perform activities during 
training with no or little learning content), and are advised by external bodies 
throughout this process. A similar detailed legislation does not exist in the Anglo-
Saxon countries.
There are several other mechanisms in place in the German apprenticeship sys-
tem that make the system more transparent, and thus help firms to build a reputation 
for providing high-quality training and that are absent in the Anglo-Saxon system. 
First, chambers of crafts, industry, and trade regularly monitor training firms, and 
have the power to withdraw the firm’s permission to train apprentices if firms do 
not meet the required standard. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the Training 
and Enterprise Councils are voluntary, operate at the local level, have purely advi-
sory status, and lack statutory power. Second, in Germany, apprentices are obliged 
to attend vocational schools once or twice per week, where they are taught general 
subjects, such as math and English, as well as subjects specific to their occupa-
tion. This provides an opportunity to find out about training in other firms. In the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the United States, in contrast, vocational 
school attendance is not compulsory.26 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in 
25 See e.g., Münch (1992), Soskice (1994), and Franz and Soskice (1995) for more details on the German 
apprenticeship system; Tritscher-Archan (2009) on the Austrian apprenticeship system; Hoeckel, Field, and Grubb 
(2009) and Hanhart and Bossio (1998) for the Swiss apprenticeship system; Ryan (2000, 2001b), Ryan and Unwin 
(2001), Gospel (1998), and Steedman, Gospe, and Ryan (1998) on the UK apprenticeship system; and Sharpe and 
Gibson (2005) and Knight and Mlotkowski (2009) on the Canadian and Australian apprenticeship system. Lynch 
(1994) provides an insightful comparison between the US training system and the German training system, empha-
sizing that training institutions are far less developed in the United States, with a high degree of firm-individual 
autonomy in training investment, and low assessment standards.
26 For instance, while in the United Kingdom many apprentices (57 percent according to a 2007 survey) receive 
some off-the-job instruction, it is not required and the educational content varies (Fong and Phelps 2008; see also 
Ryan 2000, 2001b). In the United States, federal regulation recommends 144 hours of related technical instruc-
tions per year, which may consist of instruction delivered by the employer at the employer’s place of business 
(“Standards of apprenticeship,” code of federal regulations Title 29, pt. 29.5).
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Germany apprentices take final exams at the end of the apprenticeship, which are 
centralized and organized by the chambers. This may help to detect firms that do 
not deliver on training promises, as the following example shows. Suppose that 
the exam is designed such that a (high-ability) worker who received the training 
intensity under no commitment,  τ Nc , fails the exam, while a (low-ability) worker 
who received the training intensity under commitment,  τ c , passes the exam. In 
this case, the firm’s pass rate will signal whether the firm has offered the training 
intensity under commitment or no commitment. In Australia, Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, apprentices also receive a certificate at the end 
of the apprenticeship program. However, the testing of apprentices is often carried 
out by internal assessors or the employer itself.27 If firms let apprentices pass the 
exam even if they received the training intensity under no commitment,  τ Nc , then 
the firm’s pass rate will no longer signal commitment to training provision.
C. Are subsidies a solution?
Rather than implementing policies that help to encourage commitment to 
training provision, a popular policy to increase apprenticeship training is subsi-
dies, either given to apprentices or to training firms. For instance, in the United 
Kingdom, apprenticeship funding is available from the National Apprenticeship 
Service, which covers 100 percent of the cost of off-job training for apprentices 
aged 16–18, and 50 percent of that cost for apprentices older than 19.28 Schemes 
like the 2010 Apprenticeship Grants for Employees (AGE), which offers up to 
£2,500 to employers who take on unemployed 16–17 year-olds as apprentices, 
are a further example. In Canada, a maximum $2,000 taxable cash grant is avail-
able to apprentices who complete the first or second year of their apprenticeship 
program. A further $2,000 taxable cash grant may be paid upon completion of the 
program.29 In Australia, training firms typically receive $1,250 for apprenticeship 
programs leading to basic qualification and $4,000 for apprenticeship programs 
leading to more advanced qualification.30 In Germany, in contrast, subsidies are 
paid to neither apprentices nor apprenticeship firms (see Brunello, Garibaldi, and 
Wasmer 2007).
Consider here the subsidy of apprenticeship wages, which we denote by s. The 
subsidy does not change the firm’s maximization problem (given by equations (4) 
and (3) under no commitment and commitment, respectively) in any way. Hence, 
firms that cannot commit to training provision will continue to offer the suboptimal 
training intensity  τ Nc to workers who receive the subsidy. Hence, a subsidy does 
not solve the fundamental problem of low training quality under no commitment.31
27 For more information, see the “Training and Employment” tab at http://www.apprenticeships.org.uk/
Employers/Other-Questions.aspx for the United Kingdom; Knight and Mlotkowski (2009) for Australia; and Lynch 
(1994), and Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) for the United States.
28 See http://www.apprenticeships.org.uk/Employers/Training-and-Funding.aspx.
29 See see http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/trades_apprenticeship/index.shtml.
30 See Knight and Mlotkowski (2009).
31 An apprenticeship wage subsidy may, however, induce workers to enroll in apprenticeship programs if 
there are fixed costs of training. With fixed costs, workers accept training offers under no commitment to training 
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IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a possible market failure in the firm-based apprentice-
ship training market—the nonverifiability of firm-based training. Since training takes 
place within firms, it may not be easily verifiable by a third party. Moreover, train-
ing may simply be too complex to be specified in a contract in a way that is legally 
enforceable. As a consequence, training firms may be able to renege on their train-
ing promises without getting punished. We refer to the ability of firms to credibly 
assure workers that they will not renege on their training promises and deliver the 
promised training intensity as commitment to training provision. Our hypothesis is 
that apprenticeship training schemes are more successful in countries like Germany, 
rather than in Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom, because more firms 
are able to commit to training provision in Germany than in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
We further hypothesize that this may be due to a well-structured regulatory frame-
work and monitoring institutions that exist in Germany but are largely absent in 
Anglo-Saxon countries.
We first present a model of firm-provided training and wage compression, and 
analyze it under commitment and no commitment to training provision. We show 
that the training intensity under no commitment to training provision is unambigu-
ously lower than the socially optimal training intensity under commitment to train-
ing provision. The training intensity under no commitment is closer to the socially 
optimal level the larger wage compression in the economy.
We then quantify how much lower the training intensities are in the no commit-
ment case than in the commitment case, by calibrating our model to match levels of 
wage compression observed in the data. We find that, according to our baseline esti-
mates, training intensities under no commitment are only about 28 percent of those 
under commitment to training provision. Hence, the inability of firms to commit to 
training provision results in substantially lower training intensities, which will result 
in lower enrollment rates into apprenticeship training if there are fixed costs of train-
ing and workers are ex ante heterogenous. We finally provide several pieces of evi-
dence that are consistent with the hypothesis that commitment to training provision 
is more problematic in Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular in the United Kingdom, 
than in Germany, and argue that this may be linked to differences in the regulation 
of apprenticeship training between these countries.
Which policy implications can be drawn from our findings? We believe that coun-
tries that would like to expand firm-based apprenticeship training should pay care-
ful attention that apprenticeship contracts are enforceable and that firms are able to 
commit to training provision, possibly through stricter regulation of the apprentice-
ship system, such as the monitoring of training firms, and examination of training 
achievements by external institutions. Subsidizing apprenticeship programs, in con-
trast, may not be the most effective way of expanding apprenticeship training, as it 
does not address the commitment problem.
provision only if the sum of their utility with training and the subsidy s, u( τ Nc ) + s exceeds their utility without 
training, u(0). If u( τ Nc ) < u(0), a subsidy may make workers choose training over no training.
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Appendix
A. firm-specific Training, Asymmetric information, and Wage compression
In our model, both firm-specific training and asymmetric information lead to 
wage compression. To see this, note that ∂ Π/∂ τ satisfies (under both no commit-
ment and commitment)32
   ∂ Π _∂ τ  = p (1 − g (v −  w L ))(h′ (τ)  η L −  ∂ v _∂ τ  ) 
  + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h ))(h′ (τ)  η h −  ∂ v _∂ τ  ).
Rearranging this equation, profits are increasing in training (∂ Π/∂ τ > 0) if
  ∂ v _∂ τ  <  
p(1 − g (v −  w L )) h′ (τ)  η L + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h )) h′ (τ)  η h       _____    
p(1 − g (v −  w L )) + (1 − p)(1 − g (v −  w h ))  
  = E [h′ (τ) η | stay].
This condition says that wages are compressed if training results in a larger increase 
in the productivity than in the outside option v, for those workers who stay with 
the training firm. It holds in equilibrium for two reasons. First, due to firm-specific 
training, an increase in training by one unit raises productivity at incumbent firms by 
h′(τ)η, but at outside firms only by αh′(τ)η. Second, due to asymmetric information, 
more able workers are more likely to stay with the training firm, and training raises 
the productivity of high-ability workers more than that of low-ability workers.
B. results: robustness checks
In this section, we argue that our key conclusion—that the lack of commitment 
to training provision results in substantially lower training intensities—is robust to 
alternative ways of computing the transferability of human capital, α; the productiv-
ity of high-ability workers,  η h ; and the dispersion of utility shocks, b.
Our results in Table 3 are based on an estimate for α that takes into account 
only the loss of firm-specific skills, but not that of occupation-specific skills. This 
was motivated by only firm-specificity, and not occupation-specificity leading to 
wage compression. However, the occupation-specific component of apprentice-
ship training is quite high (around 35 percent, Table 2), and ignoring the loss of 
occupation-specific skills could lead us to overstate the importance of asymmet-
ric information when explaining the wage disadvantage of movers. In panel A of 
Table A1, we therefore report the model parameter values for the productivity of 
high-ability workers,  η h , the scale parameter of the logistic distribution of utility 
32 Here, we have used the first order condition for  w L and  w h (equation (1)).
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shocks, b, and the ratio between the training intensities under no commitment and 
commitment when we use an alternative estimate for α that takes into account 
the loss of occupation, as well as firm-specific skills. For brevity, we only report 
results when model moments are computed under the assumption of commitment. 
The estimate for α is obtained by comparing the applicability of skills for work-
ers who are no longer employed at their training firm (some of which may have 
switched occupations) with that of workers who are (see column 1). This has no 
impact on our overall conclusion. For all firms, the ratio between the training 
intensities under no commitment and commitment is 14.4 percent (compared to 
28.3 percent in our baseline estimate).
An additional reason why movers earn different wages from stayers that is not 
captured by our model is job search. Movers may be worse or better matched 
with their new firm, on average, than stayers. If this were the only difference 
for the wage differential, we would expect the stayer-mover wage differential to 
gradually disappear over time; as after some time in the labor market, movers and 
stayers should have accumulated the same amount of search capital. In panel B of 
Table A1, we report the stayer-mover wage differential five years after apprentice-
ship training, the corresponding model parameter values for  η h and b, as well as 
the ratio between the training intensities under no commitment and commitment 
based on the stayer-mover wage differential five years after training. Our overall 
conclusions are again unchanged.
Yet another reason for why movers earn different wages from stayers is, as stressed 
by von Wachter and Bender (2006), worker sorting. Suppose that high-ability workers 
Table A1—Training under Commitment and No Commitment to Training Provision:  
Occupation-Specific Human Capital and Job Search
Corresponding model
Data moments parameter values Ratio training
α  q d s m d  η h b NoCom/COM
panel A. occupation-specificity
All firms 0.808 0.36 0.036 2.13 0.51 14.4%
Small firms (1–9) 0.764 0.45 −0.022 1.94 0.65 16.4%
Medium-sized firms (10–49) 0.807 0.38 0.027 2.11 0.54 21.4%
Medium-sized firms (50–499) 0.827 0.32 0.058 2.27 0.45 29.2%
Large firms (>499) 0.824 0.26 0.127 3.26 0.41 53.1%
panel B. Job search (and firm-specificity)
All firms 0.956 0.36 0.061 2.69 0.46 35.6%
Small firms (1–9) 0.936 0.45 0.032 2.41 0.59 19.8%
Medium-sized firms (10–49) 0.955 0.38 0.061 2.67 0.49 34.1%
Medium-sized firms (50–499) 0.955 0.32 0.063 2.76 0.41 39.6%
Large firms (>499) 0.953 0.26 0.108 4.37 0.37 61.7%
Notes: In panel A, we first report alternative estimates for the degree of transferability of skills (α) which take into 
account the loss of occupation-specific skills. The quit rate (qd), and the stayer-mover wage differential (smd) are 
the same as in Table 2. In panel B, we report alternative estimates for the stayer-mover wage differential that take 
into account search capital. The estimates for qd and α are the same as in Tables 1 and 2. We then display the cor-
responding model parameter values for the productivity of high-ability workers ( η h ) and the scale parameter of the 
distribution of utility shocks (b). These parameter values are chosen by minimizing the squared distance between 
the data and the model moments. We obtain the model counterparts under the assumption that all firms commit to 
training provision. Finally, we display the ratio between the training intensities under commitment and no commit-
ment to training provision predicted by our model.
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sort into firms that offer apprenticeship programs of higher quality, and that the sepa-
ration rate after training is lower in these firms. Such a sorting model also predicts, 
just like asymmetric information, a lower ability of movers, but does not necessarily 
lead to wage compression. To address this concern, we have compared wages of work-
ers who have been trained in the same firm, and among whom some stay and others 
leave the training firm, which corresponds to a fixed firm effects wage regression. The 
results are now based on a sample that heavily select on large firms. We find that once 
we control for observable firm and worker characteristics, including fixed training firm 
effects reduces the stayer-mover wage differential after apprenticeship training only 
slightly, from 0.095 to 0.090. We thus conclude that worker sorting is unlikely to bias 
our estimates for the degree of wage compression due to asymmetric information, and 
thus the decline in the training intensity due to no commitment to training provision.
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